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Abstract 
 There is cognitive, neurological, and computational support for the hypothesis that 
defocusing attention results in divergent or associative thought, conducive to insight and 
finding unusual connections, while focusing attention results in convergent or analytic 
thought, conducive to rule-based operations. Creativity appears to involve both. It is 
widely believed that it is possible to escape mental fixation by spontaneously and 
temporarily engaging in a more associative mode of thought. The resulting insight (if 
found) may be refined in a more analytic mode of thought. The questions addressed here 
are: (1) how does the architecture of memory support these two modes of thought, and (2) 
what is happening at the neural level when one shifts between them? Recent advances in 
neuroscience shed light on this. Activated cell assemblies are composed of multiple 
neural cliques, groups of neurons that respond differentially to general or context-specific 
aspects of a situation. I refer to neural cliques that would not be included in the assembly 
if one were in an analytic mode, but would be if one were in an associative mode, as 
neurds. It is posited that the shift to a more associative mode of thought is accomplished 
by recruiting neurds that respond to abstract or atypical microfeatures of the problem or 
task. Since memory is distributed and content-addressable, this fosters the forging of 
associations to potentially relevant items previously encoded in those neurons. Thus it is 
proposed that creative thought not by searching a space of predefined alternatives and 
blindly tweaking those that hold promise, but by evoking remotely associated items 
through the recruitment of neurds in a distributed, content-addressable memory. 
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What is happening in the brain when one engages in creative thought? The complex 
nature of creativity makes the goal of achieving a biological account of it difficult 
(Runco, 2004). However, progress has been made. Hoppe and Kyle (1991) studied 
Sperry’s (1966) infamous commissurotomy patients (who underwent surgical bisection of 
the corpus callosum to inhibit epileptic seizures) and found they lacked the capacity for 
integrated thought and affect-laden interpretation of experience, which they speculated 
was related to these patients’ “impoverished fantasy life”. Their work suggested that 
interaction between the two hemispheres of the brain is important for creativity. Eysenck 
(1993) provides evidence that there is a genetic basis to creativity, and that creative 
individuals are statistically more likely than average to have relatives who are psychotic. 
Recent studies have found evidence that different kinds of creativity (deliberate versus 
spontaneous, and emotional versus cognitive) involve different neural circuits (Dietrich, 
2004). Despite such accomplishments, a biological account of the creative process still 
eludes us.  
This article synthesizes findings that together provide a tentative explanation for 
what is taking place at the neural level when one puts information together in a new and 
useful, creative manner. The paper begins by reviewing cognitive, biological, and 
computational evidence for the hypothesis that creativity involves the capacity to 
spontaneously shift back and forth between analytic and associative modes of thought 
according to the situation. Noting that memory is not just a storehouse of previous 
experiences, we then examine how mental representations are encoded as cell assemblies 
composed of neural cliques in a sparse, distributed, content-addressable memory, and 
how this cognitive architecture is navigated in a stream of thought. We will see why this 
kind of memory architecture enables us to implicitly know more than we have ever 
explicitly learned, and examine the role this likely plays in the capacity to generate 
creative ideas. Integrating research from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and 
computational modeling, it is proposed that the shift to an associative mode of thought 
conducive to creative insight is accomplished by recruiting neurds: neural cliques that 
respond to abstract or atypical aspects of a problem, task, or situation. This fosters the 
forging of associations to potentially relevant items previously encoded to them. The 
paper concludes with a concrete example of what this theory predicts is happening at both 
the cognitive level and the neural level during a creative problem solving situation.  
 
Attributes of Creative Individuals 
Theories of how the creative process works owe much to studies of characteristics 
associated with high creativity. Martindale (1999) identified a cluster of such attributes. 
One is defocused attention: the tendency to not focus exclusively on the relevant aspects 
of a situation, but notice also seemingly irrelevant aspects (Dewing & Battye, 1971; 
Dykes & McGhie, 1976; Mendelsohn, 1976). Finke et al. (1992) suggest that broadening 
the focus of attention might improve creativity and help overcome fixation—the mental 
state of individuals who are unable to move beyond a known problem solving approach 
to generate a new one (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Smith, 1995). A related attribute is high 
sensitivity (Martindale, 1977, 1999; Martindale & Armstrong, 1974), including 
sensitivity to subliminal impressions; stimuli that are perceived but of which one is not 
conscious of having perceived (Smith & Van de Meer, 1994). Other traits of creative 
individuals include risk taking, tolerance of ambiguity and delayed gratification, as well 
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as strong leanings toward nonconformity and unconventionality (Crutchfield, 1962; 
Sternberg, 2006; Sulloway, 1996). 
Creative individuals also tend to have flat associative hierarchies (Mednick, 1962). 
The steepness of one’s associative hierarchy is measured by comparing the number of 
words generated in response to stimulus words on a word association test. Those who 
generate few words for each stimulus have a steep associative hierarchy, whereas those 
who generate many have a flat associative hierarchy. Thus, once such an individual has 
run out of the more usual associations (e.g., CHAIR in response to TABLE), unusual 
ones (e.g., ELBOW in response to TABLE) come to mind. The evidence that creativity is 
associated with both defocused attention and flat associative hierarchies suggests that 
creative individuals not only notice details others miss, but these details get etched in 
memory and are available later on. One’s encoding of a situation includes aspects that are 
less central to the particular concept that best categorizes it, features that may in fact 
make it defy straightforward classification as strictly an instance of one thing or another. 
However, a considerable body of research suggests that creativity involves not just 
the ability to defocus and free-associate, but also the ability to focus and concentrate 
(Eysenck, 1995; Feist, 1999; Fodor, 1995; Richards, Kinney, Lunde, Benet, & Merzel, 
1988; Russ, 1993). Feist (1999) described how that creative people are, paradoxically, 
both labile and mutable yet controlled and stable. As Barron (1963) put it: “The creative 
genius may be at once naïve and knowledgeable, being at home equally to primitive 
symbolism and rigorous logic. He is both more primitive and more cultured, more 
destructive and more constructive, occasionally crazier yet adamantly saner than the 
average person” (p. 224). How do we make sense of this seemingly contradictory picture 
of the creative individual? 
 
Contextual Focus: Shifting Between Modes of Thought 
This paradox can be reconciled. While some posit that creativity involves everyday 
thought processes such as remembering, planning, reasoning, and restructuring (Perkins, 
1981; Weisberg, 2006a, 2000b), others argue that there are cognitive processes unique to 
creativity. These include the generation of unusual or ‘remote’ associations (Mednick, 
1962) through processes such as bisociation (Koestler, 1964/1989), Janusian thinking 
(Rothenberg, 1976, 1979, 1982), integration (Sternberg, 1999), emotional resonance 
(Lubart & Getz, 1997) and divergent or associative thinking (Guilford, 1950, 1967; 
Khandwalla, 1993; Runco, 1991). Associative thought is said to be intuitive, 
unconstrained, and conducive to unearthing remote or subtle associations between items 
that share features or are correlated but not necessarily causally related. This may yield a 
promising idea or solution though perhaps in a vague, unpolished form. Extensive 
evidence suggests that associative thinking is correlated with controlled access to, and 
integration of, affect-laden material, or what Freud (1949) referred to as ‘primary 
process’ content (Russ, 1993, 2001). Associative thought is contrasted with a rule-based, 
convergent, or analytic mode of thought that is conducive to analyzing relationships of 
cause and effect between items already believed to be related. Analytic thought is 
believed to be related to what Freud termed ‘secondary process’ material. 
There is an enduring notion that thought varies along a continuum between these two 
extremes, associative and analytic (Arieti, 1976; Ashby & Ell, 2002; Freud, 1949; 
Guilford, 1950; James, 1890/1950; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kris, 1952; Neisser, 1963; 
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Piaget, 1926; Rips, 2001; Sloman, 1996; Werner, 1948; Wundt, 1896). This suggests a 
resolution to the seemingly contradictory characteristics of the creative individual. 
Several researchers have converged upon the view that creativity involves the ability to 
either shrink or expand the field of attention, and thereby match where one’s mode of 
thought lies on the spectrum from associative to analytic according to the situation one is 
in (Finke et al., 1992; Gabora, 2000a, 2000b, 2003; Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003; 
Martindale, 1995). In associative thought one considers items in detail or considers 
multiple items at once, which facilitates detecting likenesses and integrating them. In 
analytic thought one considers items in a compact or ‘atomic’ form which facilitates 
mental operations on them. This capacity to shift between analytic and associative 
thought is sometimes referred to as contextual focus, since it is brought about by the 
situation or context (Gabora, 2003).1 Related to contextual focus is the proposal that 
creativity occurs through interaction between productive and critical modes of thinking 
(Israeli, 1962, 1981), or ideation-evaluation cycles (Basadur, 1995). Although it has been 
assumed that contextual focus is subconscious, evidence that some degree of personal 
control may be involved comes from studies that showed that simply encouraging people 
to “be creative” increases scores on tests of divergent thinking (Harrington, 1975).  
Note that to be constantly in a state of defocused attention, in which relevant 
dimensions of a situation do not stand out clearly from irrelevant ones, would be 
impractical. Since associative thought is of little value in many of the routine tasks of 
daily life, and since it can lead one’s attention away from the ‘here and now’, it would be 
dangerous to have the capacity to engage in it unless one had the ability to stop it. It is 
only when one does not yet know what are the relevant dimensions—or when those 
assumed to be relevant turn out not to be—that defocused attention is of use. After the 
relevant dimensions have been found, it is efficient to focus on them exclusively. 
Associative thought would be adaptive only if the capacity for it were to have evolved 
side-by-side with the capacity to revert to a more analytic mode of thought when needed 
(i.e. if some pressing situation arises that demands a quick, logical response). Once the 
capacity to shift between analytic and associative modes of thought arose as needed, 
however, the capacity for creativity would be unprecedented. The explosion of creativity 
in the Middle/Upper Paleolithic has led to speculation that the capacity for contextual 
focus arose at this time (Gabora, 2003; Gabora & Aerts, 2009). 
In sum, when the creator is stuck or fixated, and progress is not forthcoming, 
attention becomes more defocused, the creator enters a more associative mode of thought, 
such that peripherally related elements of the situation are more readily considered. This 
may continue until a potential solution is glimpsed, at which point attention becomes 
more focused, and thought becomes more convergent, as befits the fine-tuning and 
manifestation of the creative work. Noting that a creative idea is generally considered to 
possess two main qualities—appropriateness and originality—Howard-Jones and Murray 
(2003) suggested that divergent thought ensures originality while convergent thought 
ensures appropriateness.  
Biological Support for Contextual Focus 
 There is indirect neuroscientific support for contextual focus, and in particular for 
the notion that creativity involves the ability to match where one’s mode of thought lies 
on the spectrum from associative to analytic according to the situation one is in. Prior to 
finding the solution to an insight problem there is neural recruitment of the prefrontal and 
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executive memory networks, as well as the so-called ‘default network’ associated with 
spontaneous mind wandering (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; 
Christoff, Gordon, & Smith, 2008; Kounios et al., 2006, 2008). This suggests that mind 
wandering has a utilitarian function, and provides neurological support for the notion of 
expanded receptivity through neural recruitment during associative thought.  
There is evidence of an association between creativity and high variability in 
physiological measures of arousal such as heart rate (Bowers & Keeling, 1971; Jausovec 
& Bakracevic, 1995), spontaneous galvanic skin response (Martindale, 1977), cortical 
activity (Martindale & Armstrong, 1974) and EEG alpha amplitude (Hoppe & Kyle, 
1991; Martindale, 1999; Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978). For example, although creative 
people tend to have higher resting arousal levels, low arousal, as measured by EEG 
(percentage of time spent in alpha states), is correlated with more creative problem 
solving (Martindale & Armstrong, 1974). Interestingly, low cortical arousal is observed 
only during the inspiration phase or divergent thinking component of the creative 
process. Divergent thought appears to be facilitated by lower levels of noradrenaline and 
dopamine—catecholamines directly linked to cognitive control, prefrontal functioning, 
and cortical arousal (for review see Heilman, Nadeau, & Beversdorf, 2003). 
Electroencephalography (EEG) experiments show that divergent thinking tasks produce 
decreased beta range synchrony and increased alpha range synchrony over the frontal 
cortex, providing further evidence for a loosened cognitive control and lower prefrontal 
cortical arousal during creative thought (Fink & Neubauer, 2006; Molle et al., 1996; 
Molle, Marshall, Wolf, Fehm, & Born, 1999; Razoumnikova, 2000, 2007). Collectively 
these findings suggest that during creative problem solving, creative individuals are 
particularly prone enter a state that is quite different from their normal resting state, a 
state that has both a physiological aspect (e.g. low arousal level) and a cognitive aspect 
(more divergent mode of thought). 
 
Computer Models Relevant to Contextual Focus 
The notion that thinking involves shifting between analytic and associative modes 
has been explored computationally. Starting with a model of associative memory it is 
possible, though not efficient, to simulate associative thought by injecting randomness. 
Martindale (1995) points out that something very much like a shift between divergent and 
convergent thought takes place in simulated annealing in a Hopfield network (Hopfield, 
1982).2 A Hopfield network is a kind of neural network that borrows the concept of 
energy minimization from physics. In the context of a Hopfield network, the term energy 
minimization refers to the degree of constraint satisfaction in a set of connected nodes, 
i.e., the higher the degree of constraint satisfaction the lower the energy. The extent to 
which nodes activate one another depends on the weights of the links connecting them, 
which varies according to a probabilistic function. The term temperature is used to refer 
to the degree of randomness in the weights. At a low temperature, nodes tend to activate 
only their adjacent neighbors, and to a predictable degree, while at a high temperature 
they behave more erratically. It could be said that high temperature is like divergent 
thought whereas low temperature is like analytic thought.  
A similar procedure was employed in Copycat, an analogy solving computer 
program (Mitchell, 1993; Mitchell & Hofstadter, 1989). Here temperature modulates the 
degree to which not just typical but atypical associations are made. Therefore the 
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activation of nodes at a high temperature does not come from ‘out of the blue’; it reflects 
genuine associative structure, but is not restricted to those associations that are strongest. 
This is closer to the behavior of creative individuals in Mednick’s (1962) associative 
hierarchies studies who give ELBOW in response to TABLE, which has some relevance 
to TABLE, just not nearly as much as CHAIR. The point is that the escape from fixation 
or ‘breaking out of a rut’ is accomplished not by injecting randomness, as shown in 
Figure 1a, but by capitalizing on subtleties in the associative structure of the network, as 
shown in Figure 1b.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In Copycat, the loosening of associations with increased temperature is not 
dependent on context. The halo of concepts activated by a given concept simply gets 
wider, in the same predictable way, no matter what the particular analogy problem is, or 
what other concepts are activated. In humans, however, a word or concept’s implicitly 
activated associative structure is clearly linked to and dependent upon context (Barsalou, 
1982; Nelson, Goodmon, & Ceo, 2007). In the context ‘kitchen table’ one might give 
ELBOW as an associate of TABLE, but not in the context ‘pool table’, and certainly not 
in the context ‘multiplication table’. (As is customary, concepts are indicated in capital 
letters.) As another example, shown in Figure 1c, under the context ‘Christmas’, a typical 
exemplar of TREE is FIR and a typical property is ‘needles’, but not so under the context 
‘desert island’. The generation of associations in creative thought is biased by context to 
lead to associates that are relevant to the problem (albeit in potentially obscure ways), 
and liable to lead to a solution. How is this seemingly magical feat achieved? 
A hint as to how this might be accomplished comes from stimulus classification 
tasks, which have shown that psychological space is stretched along context-relevant 
dimensions and shrunk along context-irrelevant dimensions (Nosofsky, 1987). In 
ALCOVE, a computer model of category learning, only when activation of each input 
unit is multiplied by an attentional gain factor does the output match the behavior of 
human participants (Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky & Kruschke, 1992). Thus learning and 
creative problem solving involve shifts in attention that determine how to structure the 
region of conceptual space held in working memory given the situation one is in, and the 
process of ongoing restructuring highlights those properties of a concept that are 
particularly relevant in the given context. The context-dependent restructuring of the 
problem or task enables the generation of associates that are biased by context to be more 
likely than chance to be relevant to the problem (albeit in potentially obscure or unknown 
ways). This kind of context-sensitivity is consistent with evidence that context, both 
physical (McCoy & Evans, 2002) and social (Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; 
Feldman, 1999; Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, & Gardner, 1994; Howard-Jones & Murray, 
2003; Perkins, 2000; Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995; Sternberg, 
Kaufman & Pretz, 2002) plays an important role in creative thought. However the 
activation of associates in creative thought reflects not just the current context but one’s 
history of previous contexts, and those of which are relevant to the current task may come 
together in a new way to produce a new idea. In the next section we dig a little deeper to 
see how this could work. 
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The Architecture of Memory 
We now examine evidence that an associative memory contains information that was 
never explicitly stored there but that is implicitly present nonetheless due to the ingenious 
way one’s history of experiences is encoded. It is proposed that this information is 
accessed in associative thought, and made increasingly explicit in analytic thought, 
enabling one to go beyond what one knows without resorting to trial and error.  
We take as a starting point some fairly well established characteristics of memory. 
Human memories are encoded in neurons that are sensitive to ranges (or values) of 
microfeatures (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Churchland, Sejnowski, & Arbib, 1992; 
Smolensky, 1988). For example, one might respond to a particular shade of red, or the 
quality of being shrewd, or quite likely, something that does not exactly match an 
established term (Miikkulainen, 1997). Although each neuron responds maximally to a 
particular microfeature, it responds to a lesser extent to related microfeatures, an 
organization referred to as coarse coding (Hubel & Wiesel, 1965). Not only does a given 
neuron participate in the encoding of many memories, but each memory is encoded in 
many neurons. For example, neuron A may respond preferentially to lines of a certain 
angle (say 90 degrees), while its neighbor B responds preferentially to lines of a slightly 
different angle (say 91 degrees), and so forth. However, although A responds maximally 
to lines of 90 degrees, it responds somewhat to lines of 91 degrees. The upshot is that an 
item in memory is distributed across a cell assembly that contains many neurons, and 
likewise, each neuron participates in the storage of many items (Hebb, 1949; Hinton, 
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). A given experience activates not just one neuron, nor 
every neuron to an equal degree, but activation is spread across members of an assembly. 
The same neurons get used and re-used in different capacities, a phenomenon referred to 
as neural re-entrance (Edelman, 1987). Items stored in overlapping regions are 
correlated, or share features. Memory is said to be content addressable; there is a 
systematic relationship between the state of an input and the place it gets encoded. As a 
result, episodes stored in memory can thereafter be evoked by stimuli that are similar or 
‘resonant’ in some (perhaps context-specific) way (Hebb, 1949; Marr, 1969).  
This kind of distributed, content-addressable memory architecture is schematically 
illustrated in Figure 2. Each circle represents a microfeature that is maximally responded 
to by a particular neuron. Circles that are close together respond to microfeatures that are 
similar or related. The large, diffuse region of whiteness indicates the region of memory 
activated by the current thought or experience. Note that even if a brain does not possess 
a neuron that would respond maximally to the particular microfeature because its 
representations are distributed across many neurons, the brain is still able to encode that 
experience.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The fact that memory is distributed and content-addressable is critically important 
for creativity. If it were not distributed, there would be no overlap between items that 
share microfeatures, and thus no means of forging an association between them. If it were 
not content-addressable, associations would not be meaningful. Content addressability is 
why the entire memory does not have to be searched or randomly sampled; it ensures that 
one naturally retrieves and blends items that are relevant. Content addressability also 
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facilitates the activation of one item by another that is related to it in a rarely noticed but 
useful or appealing way. Recall that if the regions in memory where two distributed 
representations are encoded overlap then they share one or more microfeatures. They 
may have been encoded at different times, under different circumstances, and the 
correlation between them never explicitly noticed. But the fact that their distributions 
overlap means that some context could come along for which this overlap would be 
relevant or useful, and cause one to evoke the other. Content addressability also means 
that there are as many routes to an association or reminding event as there are 
microfeatures by which they overlap; i.e., there is plenty of room for typical as well as 
atypical connections to be made. Because the region of activated memory locations falls 
midway between the two extremes—not distributed and fully distributed—one can 
generate a stream of coherent yet potentially creative thought (Gabora, 2002). The more 
detail with which items have been encoded in memory, the greater their potential overlap 
with other items, and the more retrieval routes for creatively forging relationships 
between what is currently experienced and what has been experienced in the past. 
Note how this differs from a typical computer memory. In a computer memory each 
possible input is stored in a unique address. Retrieval is thus a matter of looking at the 
address in the address register and fetching the item at the specified location. Since there 
is no overlap of representations, there is no means of creatively forging new associations 
based on newly perceived similarities. Even a simple connectionist memory is able to 
abstract a prototype, fill in missing features of a noisy or incomplete pattern, or create a 
new pattern on the fly that is more appropriate to the situation than anything it has ever 
been fed as input (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). The exceptions are by and large 
computer architectures that are designed to mimic, or are inspired by, human memory 
(Kanerva, 1988). 
The upshot of all this is that there is no need to posit numerous variant solutions 
generated through chance processes. In a sparse, distributed, content-addressable 
memory, items that share features can, given the appropriate context, access one another 
even if their relationship has never been explicitly noted. Experimental support for the 
hypothesis that this is what actually happens in human cognition was obtained using the 
Accumulated Clues Task, or ACT (Bowers, Farvolden, & Mermigis, 1995). Participants 
were presented 15 clue words in succession, each of which was a weak associate to the 
solution word. After each clue, participants wrote down their guess as to what the 
solution word was. Independent of both where each clue was in the sequence of clues 
given, and the number of clues needed to solve the ACT, the semantic relatedness 
between guesses and the solution word increased linearly as a function of the number of 
clues. Thus participants were closer to the correct answer than chance prior to being able 
to actually give this correct answer. This supports the position that prior to insight, an 
answer is not waiting in a dormant, predefined state to be selected from amongst a set of 
others and tweaked or mutated in a trial and error manner to achieve its final form. 
Rather, the answer appears to emerge through the retrieval of associations in an initially 
vague or ‘half-baked’ form and over time become increasingly correct, appropriate, or 
well-defined. Actually, according to Edelman (2000), one does not retrieve a stored item 
from memory so much as reconstruct it. That is, an item in memory is never re-
experienced in exactly the form it was first experienced, but colored, however subtly, by 
what has been experienced in the meantime, re-assembled spontaneously in a way that 
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relates to the task at hand. Accessing and reflecting on this implicitly present information 
enables one to ‘go beyond what one explicitly knows’ to solve a problem (or simply 
express oneself) far more efficiently than trial and error. 
Now we ask: how much overlap of microfeatures must there be for a creative 
association to be made? Another way of asking this is: how distributed must the memory 
be? At one extreme it could be not distributed at all, like a typical computer memory. If 
the mind stored each item in just one location as a computer does, then in order for an 
experience to evoke a reminding of a previous experience, it would have to be identical 
to that previous experience. And since the space of possible experiences is so vast that no 
two ever are exactly identical, this kind of organization would be fairly useless. But at 
the other extreme, in a fully distributed memory, where each item is stored in every 
location, the items interfere with one another. This phenomenon goes by many names: 
‘crosstalk’, ‘superposition catastrophe’, ‘false memories’, ‘spurious memories’ or 
‘ghosts’ (Feldman & Ballard, 1982; Hopfield, 1982; Hopfield, Feinstein, & Palmer, 
1983). 
The problem of crosstalk is solved by constraining the distribution region. One way 
to do this in neural networks is to use a radial basis function, or RBF (Hancock, Smith, & 
Phillips, 1991; Holden & Niranjan, 1997; Lu, Sundararajan, & Saratchandran, 1997; 
Willshaw & Dayan, 1990). Each input activates a hypersphere (sphere with more than 
three dimensions) of locations, such that activation is maximal at the center k of the RBF 
and tapers off in all directions according to a (usually) Gaussian distribution of width σ. 
The result is that one part of the network can be modified without affecting the capacity 
of other parts to store other patterns. A spiky activation function means that σ is small. 
Therefore only those locations closest to k get activated, but they are activated a lot. A 
flat activation function means that σ is large. Therefore locations relatively far from k 
still get activated, but no location gets very activated. 
The distinction between flat and spiky activation functions in neural networks is 
clearly reminiscent of Mednick’s (1962) flat and steep associative hierarchies, and the 
notion that flat hierarchies are associated with associative thought while steep hierarchies 
are associated with analytic thought. Recall that contextual focus entails not just the 
capacity for both associative and analytic thought, but the capacity to adjust the mode of 
thought to match the demands of the problem at a given instant. There is reason to 
believe that we engage in contextual focus using a mechanism akin to varying the size of 
the RBF: spontaneous tuning of the spikiness of the activation function in response to the 
situation. With flat activation, items are evoked in detail, or multiple items are evoked at 
once, items with overlapping distributions of microfeatures. Thus flat activation is 
conducive to forging associations amongst potentially amongst items not usually thought 
to be related, or detecting relationships of correlation. With spiky activation, items are 
evoked in a compressed form, and few are evoked at once. Thus it is conducive to mental 
operations on those items, or deducing relationships of causation.  
 
Recruitment of Neurds in Associative Thought 
Having examined the architecture of memory we have seen why one need not invoke 
randomness to explain how disparate elements are brought together in the creative 
process. Unusual ideas can come about through exploitation of uniquely forged 
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associative structure, and this can be accentuated by associative thought. Let us now 
investigate more precisely how this might work.  
It has been found that the cell assembly involved in the encoding of a particular 
experience is made up of multiple groups of collectively co-spiking neurons referred to as 
neural cliques (Lin et al., 2005; Lin, Osan, & Tsien, 2006). New techniques enabling 
their patterns of activation to be mathematically described, directly visualized, and 
dynamically deciphered, reveal that some cliques respond to situation-specific elements 
of an experience (e.g., where it took place), while others respond to characteristics of 
varying degrees of abstractness or generality. These range from the type of experience 
(e.g., being dropped) to characteristics common to many types of experience (e.g., 
anything dangerous). Lin et al. depict this as a pyramid in which cliques that respond to 
the most context-specific elements are at the top of the pyramid, and those that respond to 
the most general elements are at the bottom.  
What is a reasonable hypothesis for what is happening at the level of neural cliques 
during creative thought? Each successive thought activates recruitment of more or fewer 
neural cliques, depending on the nature of the problem, and how far along one is in 
solving it. Two well-established phenomena help ensure that this proceeds smoothly. 
First, if the same neurons are stimulated repeatedly they become refractory. For the 
duration of this refractory period they cannot fire, or their response is greatly attenuated. 
Second, they ‘team play’; a response is produced by a cooperative group of neurons such 
that when one is refractory another is active. Since the situation-general neurons and the 
situation-specific neurons are not responding to the same aspects of the situation, they are 
not entering and leaving their refractory periods in synchrony, making it highly unlikely 
that one would think the same, identical thought over and over again (although over a 
longer time frame one may repeatedly cycle back to it). 
Returning to Figure 2 we can get a schematic picture of how memory is activated by 
a particular thought. Recall that the degree to which any given region of memory is 
activated by the current thought or experience is indicated by the degree of whiteness. 
The white area thus represents the active cell assembly composed of one or more neural 
cliques, indicated by dashed gray circles. The further a neuron is from the center of the 
white region, the less activation it not only receives from the current instant of experience 
but in turn contributes to the next instant, and the more likely its contribution is cancelled 
out by that of other simultaneously active locations. Using neural network terminology, 
we say the broader the region affected by a given stimulus, the flatter the activation 
function, and the narrower the affected region, the spikier the activation function. Figure 
2 portrays a situation in which the problem is the need to invent a comfortable, informal 
chair. The white region is narrow because it is activated in an analytic mode of thought. 
Thus only neurons that respond to very typical chair features such as ‘has back’ and ‘has 
legs’ are activated. 
In a state of defocused attention more aspects of a situation get processed; the set of 
activated microfeatures is larger, and thus the set of potential associations one could 
make is larger. This situation is portrayed in Figure 3. The problem is still the need to 
invent a comfortable, informal chair, but here the activation function is flat. Recruitment 
of neural cliques that respond to abstract elements of the current thought (comfortable, 
informal) causes activation of an item in memory that share these abstract elements 
(beanbag). Its properties (‘filled with stuffing’ and ‘conforms to shape’) may seem 
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irrelevant to the task at hand, but they turn out to play a key role in the invention of the 
beanbag chair.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The neural cliques that do not fall within the activated region in Figure 2 but do fall 
within the activated region in Figure 3 are cliques that would not be included in a cell 
assembly if one were in an everyday relatively convergent mode of thought, but would be 
included if one were in an associative mode of thought. Let us refer to them as neurds. 
Neurds respond to microfeatures that are marginally relevant to the current thought. 
There is no particular portion of memory where neurds reside. The subset of neural 
cliques that count as neurds is defined by context, and shifts constantly. For each 
situation one might encounter, and for each new interpretation of that situation, a 
different group of neurds is involved. 
The explanation proposed here for what happens in creative thinking follows 
naturally from the discovery of neural cliques that respond to varying degrees of 
specificity or generality, and the evidence for contextual focus (both outlined above), as 
well as the well-established phenomenon that activation of an abstract or general concept 
causes activation of its instances through spreading activation (Anderson, 1983; Collins 
& Loftus, 1975).3 Given evidence that some neural cliques respond to specific aspects of 
a situation and others respond to more general or abstract aspects, we have a 
straightforward mechanism by which contextual focus could be executed. In associative 
thought, with more aspects of a situation taken into account, more neural cliques are 
activated, including those responding to specific elements, those responding to abstract 
elements, and those they activate through spreading activation. Activation flows from the 
specific instance to the abstract elements it instantiates, to other instances of those 
abstract elements. The concept of neurds thus provides a way of referring to those neural 
cliques that respond to features of these other instances that are not features of the 
original instance.  
In the course of routine life, neurds are excluded from the activated cell assembly. 
Their time in the limelight comes when one has to break out of a rut. In associative 
thought, broad activation causes more neural cliques to be recruited, including neurds. 
This allows the next thought to stray far from the one that preceded it while retaining a 
thread of continuity. The associative network can be not just penetrated deeply, but 
traversed quickly, and there is greater potential for representations to ‘bleed’ into one 
another in ways they never have before. Thus the potential to unite previously disparate 
ideas or concepts is high. 
 
Analysis of a Creative Act 
We have examined the relationship between contextual focus and the structure of 
human memory. This synthesis will now be applied to the analysis of a creative act. In 
keeping with the view that everyone is creative (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007; Gardner, 
1993; Runco, 2004), the creative act that we analyze is not an earthshaking achievement 
but a simple event in the life of an everyday person.  
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The situation that motivates the creative act is the following. Jane, a ski instructor, 
wants to build a fence so that she will feel safer and can let her dog run around in the 
yard. However, she cannot afford a new fence.  
Jane paces the yard trying to solve the situation through a straightforward deductive 
process. Neural cliques that have encoded memories of particular fences, and that 
respond to the concept ‘fence’, are activated. Her inability to solve the problem rationally 
eventually leads to a spontaneous and subconscious defocusing of attention. She enters an 
associative mode of thought, and her activation function becomes flat, such that the 
associative structure of her memory is more widely probed. Characteristics of fence 
posts, such as ‘tall’, ‘skinny’, and ‘sturdy’, are still strongly activated, but now they 
become less tied to fences. As neurds get recruited, her memory begins to respond to not 
just the context-specific aspects but also the abstract, conceptual aspects of her situation 
i.e. moving further down Lin et al.’s (2006) feature-encoding pyramid. She starts thinking 
not just about different kinds of fences but different ways of safeguarding her property, 
and things that are fence-like.  
Because memory is content-addressable (which as we saw earlier means that there is 
a systematic relationship between the content of an item and the locations in memory it 
activates), representations other than the concept ‘fence’ or memories of fences that have 
been encoded to these locations in the past come to mind. The neural cliques that respond 
to ‘tall’, ‘skinny’ and ‘sturdy’, now activated in the context of needing to build a fence, 
had previously encoded numerous memories of skis. These neural cliques spread 
activation to cliques that respond to more specific items that are ‘tall’, ‘skinny’ and 
‘sturdy’, such as skis, resulting in a combining of the concepts ‘skis’ and ‘fence’ to give a 
new concept: a fence made of skis. SKI FENCE has some properties unique to skis (e.g. 
bindings and curved tips) and some properties unique to fences (e.g. surrounds and 
protects property). This new association between SKIS and FENCE is not literally a 
connection but a distributed set of microfeatures that have never been activated together 
before as an ensemble. 
Jane goes to a shed crammed full of old skis. Having hit upon this idea of using skis 
to build a fence, she must determine if it would really work in practice. Although in the 
short run a flat activation function is conducive to creativity, maintaining it would be 
impractical since the relationship between one thought and the next may be remote; thus 
a stream of thought lacks continuity. Access to obscure associations would at this point 
be a distraction. Thus, now that the framework of her idea has been painted in the broad 
strokes, she enters a more analytic mode by ‘decruiting’ the neurds, thereby narrowing 
the region of memory that gets activated. Thought becomes more logical in character 
because the activation function becomes spikier, thereby affording finer control; fewer 
locations release their contents to participate in the formation of the next thought. By 
focusing attention on the promising aspects of the idea (such as that skis are long and 
skinny and available) and ignoring irrelevant aspects (such as that skis have bindings) 
Jane figures out things like what to use as crossbeams and how to drive the skis into the 
ground. She thus settles on a workable solution to her problem.  
In fact the situation is slightly more complex, because some aspects of adapting the 
idea of building a fence to using skis instead of fence posts probably require or lend 
themselves to a slightly more associative mode of thought. For example, perhaps white 
rocks at the base of the skis would not only help stabilize the skis but be suggestive of 
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snow. By shifting back and forth along the spectrum from associative to analytic, the 
fruits of associative thought become ingredients for analytic thought, and vice versa. 
Notice how it was the nature of the problem or task constraints – the unattainable ‘free 
fence’ – that guided the entire process. 
 
Summary and Conclusions  
This paper has attempted to synthesize experimental and theoretical work on 
creativity and memory into a reasonable account of how the brain generates novel ideas. 
A long-held view is that there are two modes of thought: (1) divergent or associative 
thought, which is conducive to unearthing similarity or relationships of correlation 
between items not previously thought to be related, and (2) convergent or analytic 
thought, which is conducive to hammering out causal relationships between items already 
thought to be related. It has been suggested that analytic thought requires a state of 
focused attention, and associative thought requires a state of defocused attention. 
Creativity involves not just the capacity for both, but the capacity to spontaneously shift 
between them according to the situation, referred to as contextual focus. Integrating 
evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience, it was suggested that contextual focus 
is explicable at the level of cell assemblies. A cell assembly is composed of neural 
cliques, some of which respond to situation-specific aspects of an experience, and others 
of which respond to general or abstract aspects (Lin et al., 2005, 2006). The contents of 
the activated cell assembly merge in the generation of the next instant of thought. It is 
proposed that the shift to a more associative mode of thought is accomplished by 
spontaneously flattening the activation function through the recruitment of neurds. Those 
neural cliques that respond to atypical features of the situation, and thus that are activated 
in associative but not analytic thought, are referred to as neurds. 
Leakage of information from outside the problem domain occurs in a manner that is 
a priori unpredictable because it involves unearthing associations that exist due to 
overlap of items in memory that may not have been previously noticed. Because memory 
is distributed, coarse-coded, and content-addressable, items encoded previously to neurds 
are superficially different from the present situation yet share aspects of its deep 
structure. Therefore, the recruitment of neurds may foster associations that are seemingly 
irrelevant yet potentially vital to the creative idea. By responding to abstract or atypical 
features of the situation, neurds effectively draws new concepts into the conceptualization 
of the problem. Once an insight has been found, one finds a way for it to be realized by 
focusing attention, increasing the spikiness of the activation function, and dropping 
neurds from the activated cell assembly. 
It is interesting to consider the long-term consequences of the proclivity to shift 
readily into a defocused state of attention. More aspects of attended stimuli participate in 
the process of encoding an instant of experience to memory and evoking ‘ingredients’ for 
the next instant of experience. The more they can in turn evoke, and so on. Thus not only 
is thought more associative, but streams of thought last longer. If something does manage 
to attract attention, it tends to be more thoroughly processed before settling into a 
particular interpretation of it. New information, including socially transmitted 
information, is less able to compete with this processing of previously acquired 
information that is already set in motion. Moreover, the answering of one question often 
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generates new questions. The end result is that one’s internal web of understandings is 
forged in a unique way, which is in turn reflected in its creative output. 
Lin et al. (2005) claim “Conversion of activation patterns of these coding unit 
assemblies into a set of real-time digital codes permits concise and universal 
representation and categorization of discrete behavioral episodes across different 
individual brains” (p. 6125). Unfortunately, the large-scale recording technique they used 
with mice would not be suitable for human subjects. If it were, by comparing recordings 
of particularly creative and less creative subjects on creatively demanding tasks, the 
existence and behavior of neurds could in principle be scientifically verified and 
investigated. Neurds are generally withheld from participating in a stream of thought, but 
when they do come out they come out with a vengeance, and their contribution is 
sometimes revolutionary.  
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Figure 1. Three ways in which one concept could evoke recall of associated concepts. (a) 
Top: randomly generated associates. (b) Middle: generation of associates based shared 
properties or conceptual overlap. Diminished activation with distance from target (TREE) 
is indicated by narrower lines. (c) Bottom: context-sensitive generation of associates. 
Associates of TREE generated in the context ‘desert island’ (dashed lines) differ from 
those generated in the context ‘Christmas’ (un-dashed lines). 
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Figure 2. Schematized drawing of a portion of a distributed associative memory 
activated by the problem of inventing a comfortable chair in an analytic mode of thought. 
Each small black-ringed circle represents a feature that a particular neuron responds to. 
The white region indicates the portion of memory activated by problem. The activated 
cell assembly, indicated by the large grey circle, consists of only one neural clique, 
indicated by the dashed circle. It is composed of neurons that respond to typical features 
of chairs such as ‘chair back’ and ‘chair legs’. Non-activated neural cliques are indicated 
by dotted gray circles.  
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Figure 3. As indicated by the size and diffuseness of the white region, in an associative 
mode of thought, the portion of memory activated by the problem of inventing a 
comfortable chair is larger than it was in an analytic mode (Figure 2). The activated cell 
assembly, indicated by the large oval, now contains more than one neural clique. The 
initially activated neural clique is indicated by the dashed circle, and the neurd is 
indicated by the double circle of dashes. The neurd is composed of neurons that 
respond to atypical features of chairs such as ‘conforms to shape’ and ‘filled with 
stuffing’. These features may nevertheless be relevant to the task of inventing a 
comfortable, informal chair, such as a beanbag chair. Note that under a different context, 
such as the task of making a chair for a doll, the neurd might have been a different 
neural clique, containing the neuron that responds to ‘miniature’.  
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Notes 
                                                
1 Note that divergent thought would be of adaptive value only if the capacity for it were 
to have evolved side-by-side with the capacity to revert to a more analytic mode of 
thought if needed (i.e., if some pressing situation were to arise that demanded logical 
analysis and a quick response). Once the capacity to shift between analytic and 
associative modes of thought arose as needed, however, the capacity for creativity would 
be unprecedented. Thus it has been suggested that the explosion of creativity in the 
Middle/Upper Paleolithic was due to onset of the capacity for contextual focus at this 
time (Gabora, 2003, 2007). 
 
2 The term comes from the physical process of annealing in which one changes the 
properties of a metal by slowly lowering its temperature.  
 
3 Thus for example, based on a set of free association norms data collected from 6,000 
participants using over 5,000 words, the probability that, given the word PLANET, the 
first word that comes to mind is EARTH is .61, and the probability that it is MARS is .10 
(Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004). Note that there is some empirical support for an 
alternative to spreading activation as an explanation for this kind of association data, 
referred to as ‘spooky activation at a distance’ (Nelson, McEvoy & Pointer, 2003). 
